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Abstract
We demonstrate, theoretically and empirically, that adversarial robustness can significantly
benefit from semisupervised learning. Theoretically, we revisit the simple Gaussian model of
Schmidt et al. [35] that shows a sample complexity gap between standard and robust classification.
We prove that this gap does not pertain to labels: a simple semisupervised learning procedure
(self-training) achieves robust accuracy using the same number of labels required for standard
accuracy. Empirically, we augment CIFAR-10 with 500K unlabeled images sourced from 80
Million Tiny Images and use robust self-training to outperform state-of-the-art robust accuracies
by over 5 points in (i) `∞ robustness against several strong attacks via adversarial training and
(ii) certified `2 and `∞ robustness via randomized smoothing. On SVHN, adding the dataset’s
own extra training set with the labels removed provides gains of 4 to 10 points, within 1 point of
the gain from using the extra labels as well.
1 Introduction
The past few years have seen an intense research interest in making models robust to adversarial
examples [37]. Yet despite a wide range of proposed defenses, the state-of-the-art in adversarial
robustness is far from satisfactory. Recent work points towards sample complexity as a possible
reason for the small gains in robustness: Schmidt et al. [35] show that in a simple model, learning a
classifier with non-trivial adversarially robust accuracy requires substantially more samples than
achieving good “standard” accuracy. Furthermore, recent empirical work obtains promising gains
in robustness via transfer learning of a robust classifier from a larger labeled dataset [15]. While
both theory and experiments suggest that more training data leads to greater robustness, following
this suggestion can be difficult due to the cost of gathering additional data and especially obtaining
high-quality labels.
To alleviate the need for carefully labeled data, in this paper we study adversarial robustness
through the lens of semisupervised learning. Our approach is motivated by two basic observations.
First, adversarial robustness essentially asks that predictors be stable around naturally occurring
inputs. Learning to meet such stability constraint does not inherently require labels. Second, the
added requirement of robustness fundamentally alters the regime where semi-supervision is useful.
Prior work on semisupervised learning mostly focuses on the regime where labeled data provides
only poor accuracy. However, in our adversarial setting the labeled data alone already produce
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accurate (but not robust) classifiers. We can use such classifiers on the unlabeled data and obtain
useful pseudo-labels, which directly suggests the use of self-training—one of the oldest frameworks
for semisupervised learning [33], which consists of applying a supervised training method on the
pseudo-labeled data. We provide theoretical and experimental evidence that self-training is effective
for adversarial robustness.
On the theoretical side, we consider the simple d-dimensional Gaussian model [35] with `∞-
perturbations of magnitude . We scale the model so that n0 labeled examples allow learning
a classifier with nontrivial standard accuracy, and roughly n0 · 2
√
d/n0 examples are necessary
for attaining any nontrivial robust accuracy. This implies a sample complexity gap in the high-
dimensional regime d  n0−4. In this regime, we prove that self training with O(n0 · 2
√
d/n0)
unlabeled data and just n0 labels achieves high robust accuracy. Our analysis provides a refined
perspective on the sample complexity barrier in this model: the increased sample requirement is
exclusively on unlabeled data.
On the empirical side, we propose and experiment with robust self-training (RST), a natural
extension of self-training for robustness. RST uses standard supervised training to obtain pseudo-
labels and then feeds the pseudo-labeled data into a supervised training algorithm that targets
adversarial robustness. We use TRADES [48] for heuristic `∞-robustness, and stability training [49]
combined with randomized smoothing [6] for certified `2-robustness.
For CIFAR-10 [17], we obtain 500K unlabeled images by mining the 80 Million Tiny Images
dataset [39] with an image classifier. Using RST on the CIFAR-10 training set augmented with the
additional unlabeled data, we outperform state-of-the-art heuristic `∞-robustness against strong
iterative attacks by 7%. In terms of certified `2-robustness, RST outperforms our fully supervised
baseline by 5% and beats previous state-of-the-art numbers by 10%. Finally, we also match the
state-of-the-art certified `∞-robustness, while improving on the corresponding standard accuracy
by over 16%. We show that some natural alternatives such as virtual adversarial training [24] and
aggressive data augmentation do not perform as well as RST. We also study the sensitivity of RST
to varying data amount and relevance.
Experiments with SVHN show similar gains in robustness with RST on semisupervised data.
Here, we apply RST by removing the labels from the 531K extra training data and see 4–10%
increases in robust accuracies compared to the baseline that only uses the labeled 73K training set.
Swapping the pseudo-labels for the true SVHN extra labels increases these accuracies by at most one
additional percentage point. This confirms that the majority of the benefit from extra data comes
from the inputs and not the labels.
In independent and concurrent work, Uesato et al. [41], Najafi et al. [26] and Zhai et al. [47] also
explore semisupervised learning for adversarial robustness. We compare our papers in Section 6.1.
Before proceeding to the details of our theoretical results in Section 3, we briefly introduce relevant
background in Section 2. Sections 4 and 5 then describe our adversarial self-training approach and
provide comprehensive experiments on CIFAR-10 and SVHN. We conclude the paper in Section 6.
2 Setup
Semi-supervised classification task. We consider the task of mapping input x ∈ X ⊆ Rd to
label y ∈ Y . Let Px,y denote the underlying distribution of (x, y) pairs, and let Px denote its marginal
on X . Given training data consisting of (i) labeled examples (X,Y ) = (x1, y1), . . . (xn, yn) ∼ Px,y
and (ii) unlabeled examples X˜ = x˜1, x˜2, . . . x˜n˜ ∼ Px, the goal is to learn a classifier fθ : X → Y in a
model family parameterized by θ ∈ Θ.
2
Error metrics. The standard quality metric for classifier fθ is its error probability,
errstandard(fθ) := P(x,y)∼Px,y
(
fθ(x) 6= y
)
. (1)
We also evaluate classifiers on their performance on adversarially perturbed inputs. In this work,
we consider allow perturbations in a `p norm ball of radius  around the input, and define the
corresponding robust error probability,
errp,robust(fθ) := P(x,y)∼Px,y
(∃x′ ∈ Bp (x), fθ(x′) 6= y) for Bp (x) := {x′ ∈ X | ∥∥x′ − x∥∥p ≤ }. (2)
In this paper we study p = 2 and p =∞.
Self-training. Consider a supervised learning algorithm A that maps a dataset (X,Y ) to parameter
θ. Self-training is the straightforward extension of A to a semisupervised setting, and consists of
the following two steps. First, obtain an intermediate model θˆintermediate = A(X,Y ), and use it to
generate pseudo-labels y˜i = fθˆintermediate(x˜i) for i ∈ [n˜]. Second, combine the data and pseudo-labels
to obtain a final model θˆfinal = A([X, X˜], [Y, Y˜ ]).
3 Theoretical results
In this section, we consider a simple high-dimensional model studied in [35], which is the only known
formal example of an information-theoretic sample complexity gap between standard and robust
classification. For this model, we demonstrate the value of unlabeled data—a simple self-training
procedure achieves high robust accuracy, when achieving non-trivial robust accuracy using the
labeled data alone is impossible.
Gaussian model. We consider a binary classification task where X = Rd, Y = {−1, 1}, y uniform
on Y and x|y ∼ N (yµ, σ2I) for a vector µ ∈ Rd and coordinate noise variance σ2 > 0. We are
interested in the standard error (1) and robust error err∞,robust (2) for `∞ perturbations of size .
Parameter setting. We choose the model parameters to meet the following desiderata: (i) some
(difficult to learn) classifier achieves very high robust and standard accuracies, (ii) using n0 examples
we can learn a classifier with non-trivial standard accuracy and (iii) we require much more than
n0 examples to learn a classifier with nontrivial robust accuracy. As shown in [35], the following
parameter setting meets the desiderata,
 ∈ (0, 12), ‖µ‖2 = d and
‖µ‖2
σ2
=
√
d
n0
 1
2
. (3)
When interpreting this setting it is useful to think of  as fixed and of d/n0 as a large number, i.e. a
highly overparameterized regime.
3.1 Supervised learning in the Gaussian model
We briefly recapitulate the sample complexity gap described in [35] for the fully supervised setting.
3
Learning a simple linear classifier. We consider linear classifiers of the form fθ = sign(θ>x).
Given n labeled data (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)
iid∼ Px,y, we form the following simple classifier
θˆn :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
yixi. (4)
We achieve nontrivial standard accuracy using n0 examples; see Appendix A.2 for proof of the
following (as well as detailed rates of convergence).
Proposition 1. There exists a numerical constant r such that for all 2
√
d/n0 ≥ r,
n ≥ n0 ⇒ Eθˆnerrstandard
(
fθˆn
)
≤ 1
3
and n ≥ n0 · 42
√
d
n0
⇒ Eθˆnerr
∞,
robust
(
fθˆn
)
≤ 10−3.
Moreover, as the following theorem states, no learning algorithm can produce a classifier with
nontrivial robust error without observing Ω˜(n0 · 2
√
d/n0) examples. Thus, a sample complexity
gap forms as d grows.
Theorem 1 ([35]). Let An be any learning rule mapping a dataset S ∈ (X ×Y)n to classifier An[S].
Then,
n ≤ n0 
2
√
d/n0
8 log d
⇒ E err∞,robust(An[S]) ≥
1
2
(1− d−1), (5)
where the expectation is with respect to the random draw of S ∼ Pnx,y as well as possible randomization
in An.
3.2 Semi-supervised learning in the Gaussian model
We now consider the semisupervised setting with n labeled examples and n˜ additional unlabeled
examples. We apply the self-training methodology described in Section 2 on the simple learning
rule (4); our intermediate classifier is θˆintermediate := θˆn = 1n
∑n
i=1 yixi, and we generate pseudo-labels
y˜i := fθˆintermediate(x˜i) = sign(x˜
>
i θˆintermediate) for i = 1, . . . , n˜. We then learning rule (4) to obtain
our final semisupervised classifier θˆfinal := 1n˜
∑n˜
i=1 y˜ix˜i. The following theorem guarantees that θˆfinal
achieves high robust accuracy.
Theorem 2. There exists a numerical constant r˜ such that for 2
√
d/n0 ≥ r˜, n ≥ n0 labeled data
and additional n˜ unlabeled data,
n˜ ≥ n0 · 2882
√
d
n0
⇒ Eθˆfinalerr
∞,
robust
(
fθˆfinal
)
≤ 10−3.
Compared to the fully supervised case, the self-training classifier requires only a constant number
more input examples, and roughly 2
√
d/n0 fewer labels. Intuitively, the self-trained classifier
succeeds because the intermediate classifier produces labels that are (by Proposition 1) correct
strictly more often that not. As n˜ grows, the noise averages out while a nonzero signal component
remains, and so the angle between θˆfinal and µ goes to zero. By virtue of our parameter scaling,
this guarantees very high robust and standard accuracies. We provide a rigorous proof and rates of
convergence in Appendix A.4. We remark that other learning techniques, such as EM and PCA, can
also leverage unlabeled data in this model. The self-training procedure we describe is similar to 2
steps of EM [8].
4
3.3 Semisupervised learning with irrelevant unlabeled data
In Appendix A.5 we study a setting where only αn˜ of the unlabeled data are relevant to the
task, which we model as having a signal component. We show that for any fixed α high robust
accuracy is still possible, but the required number of relevant examples grows by a factor of 1/α.
This demonstrates that irrelevant data can significantly impede self-training, but does not stop it
completely.
4 Semi-supervised learning of robust neural networks
Existing adversarially robust training methods are designed for the supervised setting. In this section,
we use these methods to leverage additional unlabeled data by adapting the self-training framework
described in Section 2.
4.1 Robust self-training
Meta-Algorithm 1 Robust self-training
Input: Labeled data (x1, y1, . . . , xn, yn) and unlabeled data (x˜1, . . . , x˜n˜)
Parameters: Standard loss Lstandard, robust loss Lrobust and unlabeled weight w
1: Learn θˆintermediate by minimizing
n∑
i=1
Lstandard(θ, xi, yi)
2: Generate pseudo-labels y˜i = fθˆintermediate(x˜i) for i = 1, 2, . . . n˜
3: Learn θˆfinal by minimizing
n∑
i=1
Lrobust(θ, xi, yi) + w
n˜∑
i=1
Lrobust(θ, x˜i, y˜i)
Meta-Algorithm 1 summarizes robust-self training. In contrast to standard self-training, we use a
different supervised learning method in each stage, since the intermediate and the final classifiers have
different goals. In particular, the only goal of θˆintermediate is to generate high quality pseudo-labels
for the (non-adversarial) unlabeled data. Therefore, we perform standard training in the first stage,
and robust training in the second. The hyperparameter w allows us to upweight the labeled data,
which in some cases may be more relevant to the task, and will usually have more accurate labels.
4.2 Instantiating robust self-training
Each stage of robust self-training performs supervised learning, allowing us to borrow ideas from
the literature on supervised standard and robust training. We consider neural networks of the form
fθ(x) = argmaxy∈Y pθ(y | x), where pθ( · | x) is a probability distribution over the class labels.
Standard loss. As in common, we use the multi-class logarithmic loss for standard supervised
learning,
Lstandard(θ, x, y) = − log pθ(y | x).
Robust loss. For the supervised robust loss, we use a robustness-promoting regularization term
proposed in [48] and closely related to earlier proposals in [49, 24, 16]. The robust loss is
Lrobust(θ, x, y) = Lstandard(θ, x, y) + βLreg(θ, x), (6)
where Lreg(θ, x) := max
x′∈Bp (x)
DKL(pθ(· | x) ‖ pθ(· | x′)).
5
The regularization term1 Lreg forces predictions to remain stable within Bp (x), and the hyperpa-
rameter β balances the robustness and accuracy objectives. We consider two approximation for the
maximization in Lreg.
1. Adversarial training: a heuristic defense via approximate maximization.
We focus on `∞ perturbations and use the projected gradient method to approximate the
regularization term of (6),
Ladvreg (θ, x) := DKL(pθ(· | x) ‖ pθ(· | x′PG[x])), (7)
where x′PG[x] is obtained via projected gradient ascent on r(x′) = DKL(pθ(· | x) ‖ pθ(· | x′)).
Empirically, performing approximate maximization during training is effective in finding classifiers
that are robust to a wide range of attacks [23].
2. Stability training: a certified `2 defense via randomized smoothing.
Alternatively, we consider stability training [49, 21], where we replace maximization over small
perturbations with much larger additive random noise drawn from N (0, σ2I),
Lstabreg (θ, x) := Ex′∼N (x,σ2I)DKL(pθ(· | x) ‖ pθ(· | x′)). (8)
Let fθ be the classifier obtained by minimizing Lstandard + βLstabrobust. At test time, we use the
following smoothed classifier.
gθ(x) := argmax
y∈Y
qθ(y | x), where qθ(y | x) := Px′∼N (x,σ2I)(fθ(x′) = y). (9)
Improving on previous work [19, 21], Cohen et al. [6] prove that robustness of fθ to large random
perturbations (the goal of stability training) implies certified `2 adversarial robustness of the
smoothed classifier gθ.
5 Experiments
In this section, we empirically evaluate robust self-training (RST) and show that it leads to consistent
and significant improvement in robust accuracy, on both CIFAR-10 [17] and SVHN [45] and with
both adversarial (RSTadv) and stability training (RSTstab). For CIFAR-10, we mine unlabeled data
from 80 Million Tiny Images, and study in depth the strengths and limitations of RST. For SVHN, we
simulate unlabeled data by removing labels, and show that with RST the harm of removing the labels
is small. This indicates that most of the gain comes from additional inputs rather than additional
labels. Our experiments build on open source code from [48, 6].
Evaluating heuristic defenses. We evaluate RSTadv and other heuristic defenses on their perfor-
mance against the strongest known `∞ attacks, namely the projected gradient method [23], denoted
PG and the Carlini-Wagner attack [4] denoted CW.
Evaluating certified defenses. For RSTstab and other models trained against random noise, we
evaluate certified robust accuracy of the smoothed classifier against `2 attacks. We perform the
certification using the randomized smoothing protocol described in [6], with parameters N0 = 100,
N = 104, α = 10−3 and noise variance σ = 0.25.
1 Zhang et al. [48] write the regularization term DKL(pθ(· | x′) ‖ pθ(· | x)), i.e. with pθ(· | x′) rather than pθ(· | x)
taking role of the label, but their open source implementation follows (6).
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Model PGMadry PGTRADES PGOurs CW [4] Best attack No attack
RSTadv(50K+500K) 63.1 63.1 62.5 64.9 62.5 ±0.1 89.7 ±0.1
TRADES [48] 55.8 56.6 55.4 65.0 55.4 84.9
Adv. pre-training [15] 57.4 58.2 57.7 - 57.4† 87.1
Madry et al. [23] 45.8 - - 47.8 45.8 87.3
Standard self-training - 0.3 0 - 0 96.4
Table 1: CIFAR-10 test accuracy under different optimization-based `∞ attacks of magnitude
 = 8/255. Robust self-training (RST) with 500K unlabeled Tiny Images outperforms the state-of-
the-art robust models in terms of robustness as well as standard accuracy. Standard self-training
with the same data does not provide robustness. † A projected gradient attack with 1K restarts
reduces the accuracy of this model to 52.9%, evaluated on 10% of the test set [15].
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Model `∞ acc. at
 = 2255
Standard
acc.
RSTstab(50K+500K) 63.8 ± 0.5 80.7 ± 0.3
Baselinest(50K) 58.6 ± 0.4 77.9 ± 0.1
Wong et al. (single) [43] 53.9 68.3
Wong et al. (ensemble) [43] 63.6 64.1
IBP [14] 50.0 70.2
(b)
Figure 1: Certified CIFAR-10 test accuracy under all `2 and `∞ attacks. (a) Accuracy vs. `2 radius,
certified via randomized smoothing [6]. Shaded regions indicate variation across 3 runs. Accuracy
at `2 radius 0.435 implies accuracy at `∞ radius 2/255. (b) Comparison to the state-of-the-art in
certified `∞ defense.
Evaluating variability. We repeat training 3 times and report accuracy as X ± Y, with X the
median across runs and Y half the difference between the minimum and maximum.
5.1 CIFAR-10
5.1.1 Sourcing unlabeled data
To obtain unlabeled data distributed similarly to the CIFAR-10 images, we use the 80 Million Tiny
Images (80M-TI) dataset [39], of which CIFAR-10 is a manually labeled subset. However, most
images in 80M-TI do not correspond to CIFAR-10 image categories. To select relevant images, we
train an 11-way classifier to distinguish CIFAR-10 classes and an 11th ‘non-CIFAR-10’ class using
a Wide ResNet 28-10 model [46] (the same as in our experiments below). For each class, we select
additional 50K images from 80M-TI using the trained model’s predicted scores2—this is our 500K
images unlabeled which we add to the 50K CIFAR-10 training set when performing RST. We provide
a detailed description of the data sourcing process in Appendix B.6.
2We exclude any image close to the CIFAR-10 test set; see Appendix B.6 for detail.
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5.1.2 Benefit of unlabeled data
We perform robust self-training using the unlabeled data described above. We use a Wide ResNet
28-10 architecture for both the intermediate pseudo-label generator and final robust model. For
adversarial training, we compute xPG exactly as in [48] with  = 8/255, and denote the resulting
model for RSTadv(50K+500K). For stability training, we set the additive noise variance to to σ = 0.25
and denote the result RSTstab(50K+500K). We provide training details in Appendix B.1.
Robustness of RSTadv(50K+500K) against strong attacks. In Table 1, we report the accuracy of
RSTadv(50K+500K) and the best models in the literature against various strong attacks at  = 8/255.
Appendix B.3 for details). PGTRADES and PGMadry correspond to the attacks used in [48] and [23]
respectively, and we apply the Carlini-Wagner attack CW [4] on 1000 random test examples, where
we use the implementation [28] that performs search over attack hyperparameters. We also tune a
PG attack against RSTadv(50K+500K) (to maximally reduce its accuracy), which we denote PGOurs
(see Appendix B.3 for details).
RSTadv(50K+500K) gains 7% over TRADES [48], which we can directly attribute to the unlabeled
data (see Appendix B.4). In Appendix C.6 we also show this gain holds over different attack radii.
The model of Hendrycks et al. [15] is based on ImageNet adversarial pretraining and is less directly
comparable to ours due to the difference in external data and training method. Finally, we perform
standard self-training using the unlabeled data, which offers a moderate 0.4% improvement in
standard accuracy over the intermediate model, but is not adversarially robust; see Appendix C.5.
Certified robustness of RSTstab(50K+500K). Figure 1a shows the certified robust accuracy as
a function of `2 perturbation radius for different models. We compare RSTadv(50K+500K) with [6],
which has the highest reported certified accuracy, and Baselinestab(50K), a model that we trained
using only the CIFAR-10 training set and the same training configuration as RSTstab(50K+500K).
RSTstab(50K+500K) improves on our Baselinestab(50K) by 3–5%. The gains of Baselinestab(50K)
over the previous state-of-the-art are due to a combination of better architecture, hyperparameters
and training objective (see Appendix B.5). The certified `2 is strong enough to imply state-of-the-art
certified `∞ robustness via elementary norm bounds. In Figure 1b we compare RSTstab(50K+500K)
to the state-of-the-art in certified `∞ robustness, showing a a 10% improvement over single models,
in performance on par with the cascade approach of [43]. We also outperform the cascade model’s
standard accuracy by 16%.
5.1.3 Comparison to alternatives and ablations studies
Consistency-based semisupervised learning (Appendix C.1). Virtual adversarial training
(VAT), a state-of-the-art method for (standard) semisupervised training of neural network [24, 27], is
easily adapted to the adversarially-robust setting. We train models using adversarial- and stability-
flavored adaptations of VAT, and compare them to their robust self-training counterparts. We find
that the VAT approach offers only limited benefit over fully-supervised robust training, and that
robust self-training offers 3–6% higher accuracy.
Data augmentation (Appendix C.2). In the low-data/standard accuracy regime, strong data
augmentation is competitive against and complementary to semisupervised learning [7, 44], as it
effectively increases the sample size by generating different plausible inputs. It is therefore natural
to compare state-of-the-art data augmentation (on the labeled data only) to robust self-training. We
consider two popular schemes: cutout [10] and AutoAugment [7]. While they provide significant
8
benefit to standard accuracy, both augmentation schemes do not improve performance when combined
with robust training.
Relevance of unlabeled data (Appendix C.3). The theoretical analysis in Section 3 suggests
that self-training performance may degrade significantly in the presence of irrelevant unlabeled data;
other semisupervised learning methods share this sensitivity [27]. In order to measure the effect on
robust self-training, we mix out unlabeled data sets with different amounts of random images from
80M-TI and compare the performance of resulting models. We find that stability training is more
sensitive than adversarial training, and that both methods still yield noticeable robustness gains
with roughly 50% relevant data.
Amount of unlabeled data (Appendix C.4). Finally, we perform robust self-training with
varying amounts of unlabeled data and make two main observations. We observe that 100K unlabeled
data provides roughly half the gain provided by 500K unlabeled data, indicating diminishing returns
as data amount grows. However, as we report in Appendix C.4, hyperparameter tuning issues make
it difficult to assess how performance trends with data amount.
5.2 Street View House Numbers (SVHN)
The SVHN dataset [45] is naturally split into a core training set of about 73K images, and an
‘extra’ training set with about 531K easier images. In our experiments, we compare three settings:
(i) robust training on the core training set only, denoted Baseline*(73K), (ii) robust self-training
with the core training set and the extra training images, denoted RST*(73K+531K), and (iii) robust
training on all the SVHN training data, denoted Baseline*(604K). As in CIFAR-10, we experiment
with both adversarial and stability training, so ∗ stands for either adv or stab.
Beyond validating the benefit of additional data, our SVHN experiments measure the loss inherent
in using pseudo-labels in lieu of true labels. Figure 2 summarizes the results: the unlabeled provides
significant gains in robust accuracy, and the loss of using pseudo-labels is below 1%. This reaffirms
our intuition that in regimes of interests accurate labels are not crucial for improving robustness.
We give a detailed account of our SVHN experiments in Appendix D, where we also compare our
results to the literature.
Model PGOurs No attack
Baselineadv(73K) 75.3 ± 0.4 94.7 ± 0.2
RSTadv(73K+531K) 86.0 ± 0.1 97.1 ± 0.1
Baselineadv(604K) 86.4 ± 0.2 97.5 ± 0.1
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Figure 2: SVHN test accuracy for robust training without the extra data, with unlabeled extra
(self-training) and with the labeled extra data. Left: Adversarial training and accuracies under
`∞ attack with  = 4/255. Right: Stability training and certified `2 accuracies as a function of
perturbation radius. Most of the gain from extra data comes from the unlabeled.
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6 Discussion
6.1 Related work
Semisupervised learning. In the rich semisupervised literature, a recent successful family of
semisupervised approaches enforces consistency in the model’s predictions under various perturbations
of the unlabeled data [24, 44], or across training [38, 34, 18]. While some authors show modest
gains from variants of self-training [20], the more sophisticated approaches based on consistency
are considered to be more successful [27]. However, most previous work on semisupervised learning
considers a regime where labeled data is scarce and standard supervised learning cannot get good
accuracy. In this work, we consider the very different regime of adversarial robustness, and observe
that robust self-training outperforms consistency-based regularization, even though the latter is
naturally applicable to a robust setting. We note that there are several other approaches to
semisupervised learning like transductive SVMs, graph-based methods, and generative modeling,
surveyed in [5, 50].
Training robust classifiers. Adversarial examples first appeared in [37], and prompted a host
of “defenses” and “attacks”. While several defenses were broken by subsequent attacks [4, 1, 3], the
general approach of adversarial training [23, 36, 48] empirically seems to offer gains in robustness.
Other lines of work attain certified robustness, though often at a cost to empirical robustness
compared to heuristics [30, 42, 31, 43, 14]. Recent work by Hendrycks et al. [15] shows that even
though pre-training has limited value for standard accuracy on benchmarks, adversarial pre-training
is effective. We complement this work by showing that a similar conclusion holds for semisupervised
learning (both practically and theoretically in a stylized model), and extends to certified robustness
as well.
Barriers to robustness. Schmidt et al. [35] show a sample complexity barrier to robustness in a
stylized setting. We observed that in this model, unlabeled data is as useful for robustness as labeled
data. This observation led us to experiment with robust semisupervised learning. Recent work also
suggests other barriers to robustness: Montasser et al. [25] show settings where improper learning
and surrogate losses are crucial, in addition to more samples; Bubeck et al. [2] and Degwekar and
Vaikuntanathan [9] show possible computational barriers; Gilmer et al. [13] show a high-dimensional
model where robustness is a consequence of any non-zero standard error, while Tsipras et al.
[40], Fawzi et al. [12] show a setting where robust and standard errors are at odds. Studying ways
to overcome these additional theoretical barriers may translate to more progress in practice.
Semisupervised learning for adversarial robustness. Independently and concurrently with
our work, Zhai et al. [47], Najafi et al. [26] and Uesato et al. [41] also study the use of unlabeled
data in the adversarial setting. We briefly describe each work in turn, and then contrast all three
with ours.
Zhai et al. [47] study the Gaussian model of [35] and show a PCA-based procedure that successfully
leverages unlabeled data to obtain adversarial robustness. They propose a training procedure that
at every step treats the current model’s predictions as true labels, and experiment on CIFAR-10.
Their experiments include the standard semisupervised setting where some labels are removed, as
well as the transductive setting where the test set is added to the training set without labels.
Najafi et al. [26] extend the distributionally robust optimization perspective of [36] to a semisu-
pervised setting. They propose a training objective that replaces pseudo-labels with soft labels
weighted according to an adversarial loss, and report results on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and SVHN with
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some training labels removed. The experiments in [47, 26] do not augment CIFAR-10 with new
unlabeled data and do not improve the state-of-the-art in adversarial robustness.
The work of Uesato et al. [41] is the closest to ours—they also study self-training in the Gaussian
model and propose a version of robust self-training which they apply on CIFAR-10 augmented with
Tiny Images. Using the additional data they obtain new state-of-the-art results in heuristic defenses,
comparable to ours. As our papers are very similar, we provide a detailed comparison in Appendix E.
Our paper offers a number of perspectives that complement [41, 47, 26]. First, in addition to
heuristic defenses, we show gains in certified robustness where we have a guarantee on robustness
against all possible attacks. Second, we study the impact of irrelevant unlabeled data theoretically
(Section 3.3) and empirically (Appendix C.3). Finally, we provide additional experimental studies of
data augmentation and of the impact of unlabeled data amount when using all labels from CIFAR-10.
6.2 Conclusion
We show that unlabeled data closes a sample complexity gap in a stylized model and that robust
self-training (RST) is consistently beneficial in practice. Our findings open up a number of avenues for
further research. Theoretically, are many labels ever necessary for adversarial robustness? Practically,
what is the best way to leverage unlabeled data for robustness, and can semisupervised learning
similarly benefit alternative notions of robustness? As data scales grow, computational capacities
increase and machine learning moves beyond minimizing average error, we expect unlabeled data to
provide continued benefit.
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Supplementary Material
A Theoretical results
A.1 Error probabilities in closed form
We recall our model x ∼ N (yµ, σ2I) with y uniform on {−1, 1} and µ ∈ Rn. Consider a linear
classifier fθ (x) = sign
(
x>θ
)
. Then the standard error probability is
errstandard (fθ) = P
(
y · x>θ < 0
)
= P
(
N
(
µ>θ
σ ‖θ‖ , 1
)
< 0
)
=: Q
(
µ>θ
σ ‖θ‖
)
(10)
where
Q (x) =
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
x
e−t
2/2dt
is the Gaussian error function. For linear classifier fθ, input x and label y, the strongest adversarial
perturbation of x with `∞ norm  moves each coordinate of x by −sign (yθ). The robust error
probability is therefore
err∞,robust (fθ) = P
(
inf
‖ν‖∞≤
{
y · (x+ ν)> θ
}
< 0
)
= P
(
y · x>θ −  ‖θ‖1 < 0
)
= P
(
N
(
µ>θ, (σ ‖θ‖) 2
)
<  ‖θ‖1
)
= Q
(
µ>θ
σ ‖θ‖ −
 ‖θ‖1
σ ‖θ‖
)
≤ Q
(
µ>θ
σ ‖θ‖ −

√
d
σ
)
. (11)
In this model, standard and robust accuracies align in the sense that any highly accurate standard
classifier, with µ
>θ
‖θ‖ > 
√
d, will necessarily also be robust. Moreover, for dense µ (with ‖µ‖1 / ‖µ‖ =
Ω(
√
d)), good linear estimators will typically be dense as well, in which case µ
>θ
σ‖θ‖ determines both
standard and robust accuracies. Our analysis will consequently focus on understanding the quantity
µ>θ
σ‖θ‖ .
A.1.1 Optimal standard accuracy and parameter setting
We note that for a given problem instance, the classifier that minimizes the standard error is simply
θ? = µ. Its standard error is
errstandard (fθ?) = Q
(‖µ‖
σ
)
≤ e−‖µ‖2/2σ2 .
Recall our parameter setting,
 ≤ 1
2
, σ = (n0d)
1/4 , and ‖µ‖2 = d. (12)
Under this setting, ‖µ‖σ =
(
d
n0
)1/4
and we have
errstandard (fθ?) = Q
((
d
n0
)1/4)
≤ e− 12
√
d/n0 and err∞,robust (fθ?) ≤ Q
(
(1− )
(
d
n0
)1/4)
≤ e− 18
√
d/n0 .
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Therefore, in the regime d/n0  1, the classifier θ? achieves essentially perfect accuracies, both
standard and robust. We will show that estimating θ from n0 labeled data and a large number
(≈√d/n0) of unlabeled data allows us to approach the performance of θ?, without prior knowledge
of µ.
A.2 Performance of supervised estimator
Given labeled data set (x1, y1) , . . . , (xn, yn) we consider the linear classifier given by
θˆn =
1
n
n∑
i=1
yixi.
In the following lemma we give a tight concentration bound for µ>θˆn/
(
σ
∥∥∥θˆn∥∥∥), which determines
the standard and robust error probabilities of fθˆn via equations (10) and (11) respectively
Lemma 1. There exist numerical constants c0, c1, c2 such that under parameter setting (12) and
d/n0 > c0,
µ>θˆn
σ
∥∥∥θˆn∥∥∥ ≥
(√
n0
d
+
n0
n
(
1 + c1
(n0
d
)1/8))−1/2
with probability ≥ 1− e−c2(d/n0)1/4 min{n,(d/n0)1/4}.
Proof. We have
θˆn ∼ N
(
µ,
σ2
n
I
)
so that δ := θˆn − µ ∼ N
(
0,
σ2
n
I
)
.
To lower bound the random variable µ
>θˆn
‖θˆn‖ we consider its squared inverse, and decompose it as
follows ∥∥∥θˆn∥∥∥2(
µ>θˆn
)2 = ‖δ + µ‖2(‖µ‖2 + µ>δ)2 =
1
‖µ‖2 +
‖δ‖2 − 1‖µ‖2
(
µ>δ
)2(
‖µ‖2 + µ>δ
)2
≤ 1‖µ‖2 +
‖δ‖2(
‖µ‖2 + µ>δ
)2
To obtain concentration bounds, we note that
‖δ‖2 ∼ σ
2
n
χ2d and
µ>δ
‖µ‖ ∼ N
(
0,
σ2
n
)
.
Therefore, standard concentration results give
P
(
‖δ‖2 ≥ σ
2
n
(
d+
1
σ
))
≤ e−d/8σ2 and P
(
µ>δ
‖µ‖ ≥ (σ ‖µ‖)
1/2
)
≤ 2e− 12n‖µ‖/σ. (13)
Assuming that the two events ‖δ‖2 ≤ σ2n
(
d+ 1σ
)
and
∣∣µ>δ∣∣ ≤ σ1/2 ‖µ‖3/2 hold, we have∥∥∥θˆn∥∥∥2(
µ>θˆn
)2 ≤ 1‖µ‖2 +
σ2
n
(
d+ 1σ
)
‖µ‖4
(
1− (σ/ ‖µ‖)−1/2
)2 .
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Substituting the parameter setting setting (12), we have that for d/n0 sufficiently large,
σ2
∥∥∥θˆn∥∥∥2(
µ>θˆn
)2 ≤√n0d +
n0d
n
(
d+ (n0d)
−1/4
)
d2
(
1− (n0/d)1/8
)2 ≤√n0d + n0n (1 + c1 (n0/d)1/8)
for some numerical constant c1. For this to imply the bound stated in the lemma we also need
µ>θˆn ≥ 0 to hold, but this is already implied by
µ>θˆn = ‖µ‖2 + µ>δ ≥ ‖µ‖2
(
1− (σ/ ‖µ‖)−1/2
)
≥ d
(
1−
(n0
d
)1/8)
> 0.
Substituting the parameters settings into the concentration bounds (13), we have by the union bound
that the desired upper bound fails to hold with probability at most
e−d/8
√
n0d + 2e−n
√
d/2(n0d)
1/4 ≤ e−c2(d/n0)1/4 min{n,(d/n0)1/4}
for another numerical constant c2 and d/n0 > 1.
As an immediate corollary to Lemma 1, we obtain the sample complexity upper bounds cited in
the main text.
Proposition 1. There exists a numerical constant r such that for all 2
√
d/n0 ≥ r,
n ≥ n0 ⇒ Eθˆnerrstandard
(
fθˆn
)
≤ 1
3
and n ≥ n0 · 42
√
d
n0
⇒ Eθˆnerr
∞,
robust
(
fθˆn
)
≤ 10−3.
Proof. For the case n ≥ n0 we take r sufficiently large such that by Lemma 1 we have
µ>θˆn
σ
∥∥∥θˆn∥∥∥ ≥
1√
2
(
n0
n +
√
n0
d
) ≥ 12 with probability ≥ 1− e−c2√d/n0
for an appropriate c2. Therefore by the expression (10) for the standard error probability (and the
fact that it is never more than 1), we have
Eθˆnerrstandard
(
fθˆn
)
≤ Q
(
1
2
)
+ e−c2(d/n0)
1/8 ≤ 1
3
for appropriate r. Similarly, for the case n ≥ n0 · 42
√
d
n0
we apply Lemma 1 combined with  < 12
to write
µ>θˆn
σ
∥∥∥θˆn∥∥∥ ≥
1√
2
(
n0
n +
√
n0
d
) ≥ 1√
2
(
n0
42
√
n0d
+ 1
42
√
n0
d
) = √2( dn0
)1/4
with probability ≥ 1 − e−c2(d/n0)1/4 min{n,(d/n0)1/4}. Therefore, using the expression (11) and σ =
(n0d)
1/4, we have (using n ≥ 2 (d/n0)1/4)
Eθˆnerr
∞,
robust
(
fθˆn
)
≤ Q
([√
2− 1
]
(d/n0)
1/4
)
+ e−
2c2
√
d/n0 ≤ 10−3,
for sufficiently large r.
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A.3 Lower bound
We now briefly explain how to translate the sample complexity lower bound of Schmidt et al. [35]
into our parameter setting.
Theorem 1 ([35]). Let An be any learning rule mapping a dataset S ∈ (X ×Y)n to classifier An[S].
Then,
n ≤ n0 
2
√
d/n0
8 log d
⇒ E err∞,robust(An[S]) ≥
1
2
(1− d−1), (5)
where the expectation is with respect to the random draw of S ∼ Pnx,y as well as possible randomization
in An.
Proof. The setting of our theorem is identical to that of Theorem 11 in Schmidt et al. [35], which
shows that
E err∞,robust(An[S]) ≥
1
2
P
(
‖N (0, I)‖∞ ≤ 
√
1 +
σ2
n
)
.
Using σ2 =
√
n0d, n ≤ 2
√
n0d
8 log d implies 
√
1 + σ
2
n ≥
√
8 log d and therefore
E err∞,robust(An[S]) ≥
1
2
P
(
‖N (0, I)‖∞ ≤
√
8 log d
)
.
Moreover
P
(
‖N (0, I)‖∞ ≤
√
8 log d
)
=
(
1−Q
(√
8 log d
))d ≥ (1− e−4 log d)d ≥ 1− 1
d
.
A.4 Performance of semisupervised estimator
We now consider the semisupervised setting—our primary object of study in this paper. We consider
the self-training estimator that in the first stage uses n ≥ n0 labeled examples to construct
θˆintermediate := θˆn,
and then uses it to produce pseudo-labels
y˜i = sign
(
x˜>i θˆintermediate
)
for the n˜ unlabeled data points x˜1, . . . , x˜n˜. In the second and final stage of self-training, we employ
the same simple learning rule on the pseudo-labeled data and construct
θˆfinal :=
1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
y˜ix˜i.
The following result shows a high-probability bound on µ
>θˆfinal
σ‖θˆfinal‖ , analogous to the one obtained for
the fully supervised estimator in Lemma 1 (with different constant factors).
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Lemma 2. There exist numerical constants c˜0, c˜1, c˜2 > 0 such that under parameter setting (12)
and d/n0 > c˜0,
µ>θˆfinal
σ
∥∥∥θˆfinal∥∥∥ ≥
(√
n0
d
+
72n0
n˜
(
1 + c˜1
(n0
d
)−1/4))−1/2
with probability ≥ 1− e−c˜2 min
{
n˜,n0(d/n0)
1/4,
√
d/n0
}
.
Proof. The proof follows a similar argument to the one used to prove Lemma 1, except now we have
to to take care of the fact that the noise component in θˆfinal is not entirely Gaussian. Let bi be the
indicator that the ith pseudo-label is incorrect, so that x˜i ∼ N
(
(1− 2bi) y˜iµ, σ2I
)
, and let
γ :=
1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
(1− 2bi) ∈ [−1, 1].
We may write the final estimator as
θˆfinal =
1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
y˜ix˜i = γµ+
1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
y˜iεi
where εi ∼ N
(
0, σ2I
)
independent of each other. Defining
δ˜ := θˆfinal − γµ
we have the decomposition and bound∥∥∥θˆfinal∥∥∥2(
µ>θˆfinal
)2 =
∥∥∥δ˜ + γµ∥∥∥2(
γ ‖µ‖2 + µ>δ˜
)2 = 1‖µ‖2 +
∥∥∥δ˜ + γµ∥∥∥2 − 1‖µ‖2 (γ ‖µ‖2 + µ>δ˜)2(
γ ‖µ‖2 + µ>δ˜
)2
=
1
‖µ‖2 +
‖δ˜‖2 − 1‖µ‖2
(
µ>δ˜
)2(
γ ‖µ‖2 + µ>δ˜
) ≤ 1‖µ‖2 + ‖δ˜‖2‖µ‖4 (γ + 1‖µ‖2µ>δ˜)2 . (14)
To write down concentration bounds for ‖δ˜‖2 and µ>δ˜ we must address their non-Gaussianity.
To do so, choose a coordinate system such that the first coordinate is in the direction of θˆintermediate,
and let v(i) denote the ith entry of vector v in this coordinate system. Then
y˜i = sign
(
x˜
(1)
i
)
= sign
(
µ(1) + ε
(1)
i
)
.
Consequently, ε(j)i is independent of y˜i for all i and j ≥ 2, so that y˜iε(j)i ∼ N
(
0, σ2
)
and
1
n˜
∑n˜
i=1 y˜iε
(j)
i ∼ N
(
0, σ2/n˜
)
and
d∑
j=2
(
1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
y˜iε
(j)
i
)2
∼ σ
2
n˜
χ2d−1.
Moreover, we have by Cauchy–Schwarz(
1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
y˜iε
(1)
i
)2
≤ 1
n˜2
(
n˜∑
i=1
y˜2i
)(
n˜∑
i=1
[
ε
(1)
i
]2)
=
1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
[
ε
(1)
i
]2 ∼ σ2
n˜
χ2n˜.
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Therefore, since ‖δ˜‖2 = ∑dj=1 ( 1n˜∑n˜i=1 y˜iε(j)i )2, we have by the union bound
P
(
‖δ˜‖2 ≥ 2σ
2
n˜
(d− 1 + n˜)
)
≤ P (χ2n˜ ≥ 2n˜)+ P (χ2d−1 ≥ 2 (d− 1)) ≤ e−n˜/8 + e−(d−1)/8. (15)
The same technique also yields a crude bound on µ>δ˜ = 1n˜
∑n˜
i=1 y˜iµ
>εi. Namely, we have
(
µ>δ˜
)2 ≤ 1
n˜2
(
n˜∑
i=1
y˜2i
)(
n˜∑
i=1
(
µ>εi
)2)
=
1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
(
µ>εi
)2 ∼ σ2 ‖µ‖2
n˜
χ2n˜
and therefore
P
(∣∣∣µ>δ˜∣∣∣ ≥ √2σ ‖µ‖) = P(∣∣∣µ>δ˜∣∣∣2 ≥ 2σ2 ‖µ‖2) ≤ e−n˜/8.
Finally, we need to argue that γ is not too small. Recall that γ = 1n˜
∑n˜
i=1 (1− 2bi)where bi is the
indicator that y˜i is incorrect and therefore
E
[
γ | θˆintermediate
]
= 1− 2errstandard(fθˆintermediate),
so we expect γ to be reasonably large as long as errstandard(fθˆintermediate) <
1
2 . Indeed,
P
(
γ <
1
6
)
= P
(
1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
(1− 2bi) < 1
6
)
≤ P
(
errstandard(fθˆintermediate) >
1
3
)
+ P
(
1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
bi <
5
12
| errstandard(fθˆintermediate) ≤
1
3
)
.
Note that
1
3
≥ Q
(
1
2
)
≥ Q
([
2
(
1 +
√
n0/d
)]−1/2)
Therefore, by Lemma 1, for sufficiently large d/n0,
P
(
errstandard(fθˆintermediate) >
1
3
)
≤ e−c·min
{√
d/n0,n0(d/n0)
1/4
}
for some constant c. Moreover, by Bernoulli concentration (Hoeffding’s inequality) we have that
P
(
1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
bi <
5
12
| errstandard(fθˆintermediate) ≤
1
3
)
≤ e−2n˜( 512− 13)
2
= e−n˜/72.
Define the event,
E =
{
‖δ˜‖2 ≥ 2σ
2
n˜
(d+ n˜) ,
∣∣∣µ>δ˜∣∣∣ ≤ √2σ ‖µ‖ and γ ≥ 1
6
}
;
by the preceding discussion,
P
(EC) ≤ 2e−n˜/8 + e−(d−1)/8 + e−c·min{√d/n0,n0(d/n0)1/4} + e−n˜/72 ≤ e−c˜2 min{n˜,√d/n0,n0(d/n0)1/4}.
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Moreover, by the bound (14), E implies∥∥∥θˆfinal∥∥∥2(
µ>θˆfinal
)2 ≤ 1‖µ‖2 + 2σ2 (d+ n˜)n˜ ‖µ‖4 (16 − √2σ‖µ‖ )2 .
Substituting σ = (n0d)1/4 and ‖µ‖ =
√
d and multiplying by σ2 gives
σ2
∥∥∥θˆfinal∥∥∥2(
µ>θˆfinal
)2 ≤√n0d + 2 (n0d) (d+ n˜)
n˜d2
(
1
6 −
√
2
(
n0
d
)1/4)2
≤
√
n0
d
+
72n0
n˜
(
1 + c˜1
(n0
d
)−1/4)
for appropriate c˜1 and sufficiently large d/n0. As argued in Lemma 1, the event E already implies
µ>θˆfinal ≥ 0, and therefore the result follows.
Lemma 2 immediately gives a sample complexity upper bound for the self-training classifier θˆfinal
trained with n labeled data and n˜ unlabeled data.
Theorem 2. There exists a numerical constant r˜ such that for 2
√
d/n0 ≥ r˜, n ≥ n0 labeled data
and additional n˜ unlabeled data,
n˜ ≥ n0 · 2882
√
d
n0
⇒ Eθˆfinalerr
∞,
robust
(
fθˆfinal
)
≤ 10−3.
Proof. We take r˜ sufficiently large so that by Lemma 2 we have, using σ = (n0d)1/4 and  < 12 ,
µ>θˆn
σ
∥∥∥θˆn∥∥∥ ≥
1√
2
(
72n0
n +
√
n0
d
) ≥ 1√
2
(
n0
42
√
n0d
+ 1
42
√
n0
d
) = √2( dn0
)1/4
with probability ≥ 1 − e−c˜2 min
{
n˜,n0(d/n0)
1/4,
√
d/n0
}
≥ 1 − e−2c˜2(d/n0)1/4 . Therefore, using the
expression (11) and σ = (n0d)1/4, we have (using n ≥ 2 (d/n0)1/4)
Eθˆnerr
∞,
robust
(
fθˆn
)
≤ Q
([√
2− 1
]
(d/n0)
1/4
)
+ e−
2c˜2(d/n0)
1/4 ≤ 10−3,
for sufficiently large r˜.
A.5 Performance in the presence of irrelevant data
To model the presence of irrelevant data, we consider a slightly different model where, for α ∈ (0, 1),
αn˜ of the unlabeled data are distributed as N (yiµ, σ2I) as before, while the other (1− α) n˜ unlabeled
data are drawn from N (0, σ2I) (with no signal component). We note that similar conclusions would
hold if we let the irrelevant unlabeled data be drawn from N (µ2, σ2I) for some µ2 such that ∣∣µ>µ2∣∣
is sufficiently small, for example µ2 ∼ N (0, I) independent of µ. We take µ2 = 0 to simplify the
presentation.
To understand the impact of irrelevant data we need to establish two statements. First, we
would like to show that adversarial robustness is still possible given sufficiently large n˜, namely
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Ω
(
2
√
n0d/α
2
)
; a factor 1/α more relevant data then what our previous result required. Second,
we wish to show that this upper bound is tight. That is, we would like to show that self-training
with n0 labeled data and O
(
2
√
n0d/α
2
)
α-relevant unlabeled data fails to achieve robustness. We
make these statements rigorous in the following.
Theorem 3. There exist numerical constants c and r such the following holds under parameter
setting (12) , α-fraction of relevant unlabeled data and min{2/ log d, α2}√d/n0 > r. First,
n˜ ≥ n0 · 288
2
α2
√
d
n0
⇒ Eθˆfinalerr
∞,
robust
(
fθˆfinal
)
≤ 10−3.
Second, there exists µ ∈ Rd for which
n˜ ≤ n0 c · 
2
α2
√
d
n0
⇒ Eθˆfinalerr
∞,
robust
(
fθˆfinal
)
≥ 1
2
(
1− 1
d
)
.
Examining the robust error probability (11), establishing these results requires upper and lower
bounds on the quantity µ
>θˆfinal
‖θˆfinal‖
as well as a lower bound on ‖θˆfinal‖1‖θˆfinal‖
. We begin with the former,
which is a two-sided version of Lemma 2.
Lemma 3. There exist numerical constants c¯0, c1, c¯1, c¯2 such that under parameter setting (12),
α-fraction of relevant unlabeled data and d/n0 > c¯0/α4,(√
n0
d
+
72n0
α2n˜
(
1 +
c¯1
α
(n0
d
)−1/4))−1/2 ≤ µ>θˆfinal
σ
∥∥∥θˆfinal∥∥∥ ≤
(√
n0
d
+
n0
2α2n˜
(
1− c1
α
(n0
d
)−1/4))−1/2
,
with probability ≥ 1− e−c¯2 min
{
αn˜,n0(d/n0)
1/4,
√
d/n0
}
.
The proof of Lemma 3 is technical and very similar to the proof of Lemma 2, so we defer it
Section A.5.1. We remark that in the regime n˜ ≥ α−2, a more careful concentration argument
would allow us to remove α from the condition d/n0 > c¯0/α4 and the high order terms of the form
c1
α
(
n0
d
)−1/4 in Lemma 3.
Next, argue that—at least for certain values of µ—the self-training estimator θˆfinal is dense in
the sense that ‖θˆfinal‖1/‖θˆfinal‖ is within a constant of
√
d.
Lemma 4. Let µ be the all-ones vector. There exist constants k1, k2 such that under parameter
setting (12), α-fraction of relevant unlabeled data and d ≥ n˜ ≥ 30,
‖θˆfinal‖1
‖θˆfinal‖
≥ k1
√
d with probability ≥ 1− e−k0 min{n˜,d}.
We prove Lemma 4 in Section A.5.2. Armed with the necessary bounds, we prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. The case n˜ ≥ 288
α2
2
√
n0d follows from Lemma 3 using an argument identical
to the one used in the proof of Theorem 1. To show the case n˜ ≤ c
α2
2
√
n0d, we take r such that
c1
α
(
n0
d
)−1/4
< 12 and apply the upper bound in Lemma 3 to obtain
µ>θˆfinal
σ
∥∥∥θˆfinal∥∥∥ ≤ 2α
√
n˜/n0 ≤
√
c
(
d
n0
)1/4
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with probability 1− e−c¯2 min
{
αn˜,n0(d/n0)
1/4,
√
d/n0
}
. Next by Lemma 4, we have
‖θˆfinal‖1
‖θˆfinal‖
≥
√
d
k1
with probability at least 1− e−k0 min{n˜,d}. Therefore, taking c ≤ 1
k21
, we have and using σ = (n0d)1/4
and the expression (11) for the robust error probability, we have
Eθˆfinalerr
∞,
robust
(
fθˆfinal
)
≥ 1
2
P
 µ>θˆfinal
σ
∥∥∥θˆfinal∥∥∥ −
‖θˆfinal‖1
σ‖θˆfinal‖
≤ 0

≥ 1
2
(
1− e−c¯2 min
{
αn˜,n0(d/n0)
1/4,
√
d/n0
}
− e−k0 min{n˜,d}
)
.
Finally, we may assume without loss of generality αn˜ ≥ 2
√
n0d
8 log d −n0 because otherwise the result holds
by Theorem 1. Using
√
d/n0 ≥ −2r log d and taking r sufficiently large, we have that αn˜ ≥ 2
√
n0d
16 log d .
Therefore, e−c¯2 min
{
αn˜,n0(d/n0)
1/4,
√
d/n0
}
+ e−k0 min{n˜,d} ≤ 1d for sufficiently large r.
A.5.1 Proof of Lemma 3
The proof is largely the same as the proof of Lemma 2. We redefine bi to be the indicator of y˜i being
incorrect when i is relevant, and 1/2 when it is irrelevant. Then, x˜i ∼ N
(
(1− 2bi) y˜iµ, σ2I
)
, and
with
γ :=
1
αn˜
n˜∑
i=1
(1− 2bi) ∈ [−1, 1]
we may write the final classifier as
θˆfinal =
1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
y˜ix˜i = αγµ+
1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
y˜iεi
where εi ∼ N
(
0, σ2I
)
independent of each other. Defining
δ˜ := θˆfinal − αγµ
we have the decomposition and bound∥∥∥θˆfinal∥∥∥2(
µ>θˆfinal
)2 = 1‖µ‖2 +
‖δ˜‖2 − 1‖µ‖2
(
µ>δ˜
)2
(
αγ ‖µ‖2 + µ>δ˜
)2 ≤ 1‖µ‖2 + ‖δ˜‖2‖µ‖4 (αγ + 1‖µ‖2µ>δ˜)2 . (16)
As argued in the proof of Lemma (2),
P
(
‖δ˜‖2 ≥ 2σ
2
n˜
(d− 1 + n˜)
)
≤ e−n˜/8 + e−(d−1)/8.
and
P
(∣∣∣µ>δ˜∣∣∣ ≥ √2σ ‖µ‖) ≤ e−n˜/8.
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Moreover, γ is exactly the average of 1 − 2bi over the relevant data, and therefore, as argued in
Lemma (2),
P
(
γ <
1
6
)
≤ e−αn˜/72 + e−c·min
{√
d/n0,n0(d/n0)
1/4
}
.
Under the event E =
{
‖δ˜‖2 ≤ 2σ2n˜ (d+ n˜) ,
∣∣∣µ>δ˜∣∣∣ ≤ √2σ ‖µ‖ and γ ≥ 16},∥∥∥θˆfinal∥∥∥2(
µ>θˆfinal
)2 ≤ 1‖µ‖2 + 2σ2 (d+ n˜)α2n˜ ‖µ‖4 (16 − √2σα‖µ‖)2 .
Substituting ‖µ‖2 = d and σ2 = √n0d and multiplying by σ2, we have
σ2
∥∥∥θˆfinal∥∥∥2(
µ>θˆfinal
)2 ≤√n0d + 2 (n0d) (d+ n˜)
α2n˜d2
(
1
6 −
√
2
α
(
n0
d
)1/4)2 ≤
√
n0
d
+
72n0
α2n˜
(
1 +
c¯1
α
(n0
d
)1/4)
for appropriate c¯1 and α4 (d/n0) sufficiently large, which also implies µ>θˆfinal ≥ 0. To obtain the
other direction of the bound, we note that in the coordinate system where the first coordinate is in
the direction of θˆintermediate,
‖δ˜‖2 ≥
d∑
j=2
(
1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
y˜iε
(j)
i
)2
∼ σ
2
n˜
χ2d−1
and therefore
P
(
‖δ˜‖2 ≤ 1
2
σ2
n˜
(d− 1)
)
≤ e−n˜/32.
Therefore, under E ′ =
{
‖δ˜‖2 ≥ 12 σ
2
n˜ (d− 1) ,
∣∣∣µ>δ˜∣∣∣ ≤ √2σ ‖µ‖ and γ ≥ 16}, substituting into (16)
we have ∥∥∥θˆfinal∥∥∥2(
µ>θˆfinal
)2 ≥ 1‖µ‖2 + σ2 (d− 1)2α2n˜ ‖µ‖4 (1 + √2σα‖µ‖)2 −
2σ2
α2n˜ ‖µ‖4
(
1
6 −
√
2σ
α‖µ‖
)2 .
Substituting ‖µ‖2 = d and σ2 = √n0d and multiplying by σ2, we have
σ2
∥∥∥θˆfinal∥∥∥2(
µ>θˆfinal
)2 ≥√n0d + (n0d) (d− 1)
2α2n˜d2
(
1 +
√
2
α
(
n0
d
)1/4)2 − 2n0d
α2n˜d2
(
1
6 −
√
2
α
(
n0
d
)1/4)2
≥
√
n0
d
+
n0
2α2n
(
1− c1
α
(n0
d
)1/4)
for appropriate c1 and α4 (d/n0) sufficiently large. Both inequalities hold under E ∪ E ′, which by the
preceding discussion fails with probability at most
e−n˜/32 + e−αn˜/72 + e−c·min
{√
d/n0,n0(d/n0)
1/4
}
+ 2e−n˜/8 + e−(d−1)/8 ≤ e−c¯2 min
{
αn˜,n0(d/n0)
1/4,
√
d/n0
}
for appropriate c¯2.
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A.5.2 Proof of Lemma 4
As in the proof of Lemma 3 we define bi to be the indicator of y˜i being incorrect when i is relevant,
and 1/2 otherwise. So that we may write
θˆfinal = αγµ+
1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
y˜iεi, where γ :=
1
αn˜
n˜∑
i=1
(1− 2bi) and εi ∼ N
(
0, σ2I
)
.
We further decompose εi to components orthogonal and parallel to θˆintermediate, εi = ε⊥i + ε
‖
i , so that
ε⊥i ∼ N
(
0, σ2
(
1− pipiT )) and ε‖i ∼ N (0, σ2pipiT ), where pi is a unit vector parallel to θˆintermediate.
We note that ε⊥i is independent of y˜i and of ε
‖
i . Let [v]j denote the jth coordinate of vector v in the
standard basis, such that
‖θˆfinal‖1 =
d∑
j=1
|[θˆfinal]j | =
d∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣αγ + 1n˜
n˜∑
i=1
y˜i
[
ε⊥i
]
j
+
1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
y˜i
[
ε
‖
i
]
j
∣∣∣∣∣ .
We define
J =
{
j | [pi]2j ≤
2
d
}
, so that |J | ≥ d
2
since pi is a unit vector. For every j, 1n˜
∑n˜
i=1 y˜i
[
ε⊥i
]
j
∼ N
(
0, σ
2
n˜
(
1− [pi]2j
))
and therefore for every
j ∈ J
P
(
1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
y˜i
[
ε⊥i
]
j
>
σ√
n˜
(
1− 2
d
))
≥ Q (1) ≥ 1
8
.
Moreover, by Cauchy–Schwarz(
1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
y˜i
[
ε
‖
i
]
j
)2
≤ 1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
[
ε
‖
i
]2
j
∼ σ
2 [pi]2j
n˜
χn˜
and therefore for every j ∈ J
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1n˜
n˜∑
i=1
y˜i
[
ε
‖
i
]
j
∣∣∣∣∣ > 2σ√n˜d
)
≤ e−n˜/8.
Therefore, with probability at at least Q (1)− e−n˜/8 ≥ 110 for n˜ ≥ 30,∣∣∣∣∣αγ + 1n˜
n˜∑
i=1
y˜i
[
ε⊥i
]
j
+
1
n˜
n˜∑
i=1
y˜i
[
ε
‖
i
]
j
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ αγ + σ√n˜
(√
1− 2
d
− 2√
d
)
≥ αγ + σ
2
√
n˜
(17)
for d ≥ 20. We implicitly assumed here γ > 0, which we have previously argued to hold with high
probability. However, an analogous bound holds if γ ≤ 0 and so we don’t need to take the this into
account here.
Let J ′ be the random set of coordinates for which the inequality (17) holds; we have ‖θˆfinal‖1 ≥
d
(
αγ + σ
2
2n˜
)
|J ′| ≥ d
(
αγ + σ
2
2n˜
)
|J ′ ∩ J |. Moreover, by the above discussion |J ′ ∩ J | is binomial with
at least d/2 trials and success probability at least 1/10. Therefore
P
(∣∣J ′ ∩ J∣∣ ≤ d
20
− d
40
)
≤ e−2(d/2)/202 = e−d/400.
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And consequently we have
‖θˆfinal‖1 ≥ d
40
(
αγ +
σ2
2n˜
)
with probability ≥ 1− e−d/400.
Next we need to argue about the Euclidean norm
‖θˆfinal‖ = ‖αγµ+ δ˜‖ ≤ ‖αγµ‖+ ‖δ˜‖ = αγ
√
d+ ‖δ˜‖
with δ˜ = 1n˜
∑n˜
i=1 y˜iεi. As argued in Eq. (15) in the proof of Lemma 2,
P
(
‖δ˜‖2 ≥ 2σ
2
n˜
(d− 1 + n˜)
)
≤ e−n˜/8 + e−(d−1)/8.
Under ‖θˆfinal‖1 ≥ d40
(
αγ + σ
2
2n˜
)
and ‖δ˜‖2 ≤ 2σ2n˜ (d− 1 + n˜) ≤ 2σ
2
n˜
(√
d+
√
n˜
)2
we have
‖θˆfinal‖1
‖θˆfinal‖
≥ d
40
√
d
αγ + 12σn˜
−1/2
αγ +
√
2σn˜−1/2 +
√
2σd−1/2
≥
√
d
k1
for d ≥ n˜ and k1 = 160
√
2. By the preceding discussion, this happens with probability at least
1− e−n˜/8 − e−(d−1)/8 − e−d/400 ≥ 1− ek1 min{n˜,d}.
B CIFAR-10 experimental setup
B.1 Training hyperparameters
Here we describe the training hyperparameters used in our main CIFAR-10 experiments. Our
additional experiments in Appendix C use the same hyperparameters unless otherwise mentioned.
Architecture. We use a Wide ResNet 28-10 architecture, as in [23] and similarly to [48], who use
a 34-10 variant.
Robust self-training. We set the regularization weight β = 6 as in [48]. We implicitly set the
unlabeled data weight to w = 50K/500K = 0.1 by composing every batch from equal parts labeled
and unlabeled data.
Adversarial self-training. We compute xPG exactly as in [48], with step size 0.007, 10 iterations
and  = 8/255.
Stability training. We set the additive noise variance to σ = 0.25. We perform the certification
using the randomized smoothing protocol described in [6], with parameters N0 = 100, N = 104,
α = 10−3 and noise variance σ = 0.25.
Input normalization. We scale each pixel in the input image by 1/255, to be in [0, 1].
Data augmentation. We perform the standard CIFAR-10 data augmentation: a random 4-pixel
crop followed by a random horizontal flip.
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Optimizer configuration. We use the hyperparameters [7] prescribe for Wide ResNet 28-10 and
CIFAR-10, except for batch size and number of epochs: initial learning rate 0.1, cosine learning rate
annealing [22] (without restarts), weight decay 5 · 10−4 and SGD with Nesterov momentum 0.9. To
speed up robust training, we doubled the batch size from 128 and 256. (This way, every batch has
128 original CIFAR-10 images and 128 pseudo-labeled imaged).
Number of gradient steps. Since we increase the dataset size by a factor of 10, we expect to
require more steps for training to converge. However, due to the high cost of adversarial training
(caused by the inner optimization loop), we restricted the training of RSTadv(50K+500K) to 39K
gradient steps. This corresponds to 100 CIFAR-10 epochs at batch size 128, which is standard.
Stability training is much cheaper (involving only random sampling at each step), and we train
RSTstab(50K+500K) for 156K gradient steps. Training for longer will likely enhance performance, but
probably not dramatically.
Pseudo-label generation. We used the same model to generate the pseudo-labels in all of our
CIFAR-10 robust-training experiments. They were generated by a Wide ResNet 28-10 which we
trained on the CIFAR-10 training set only. The training parameters were exactly like those of the
baseline in [7] (with standard augmentation). That is to say, training parameters were as above,
except we used batch size 128 and ran 200 epochs. The resulting model had 96.0% accuracy on the
CIFAR-10 test set.
Baselines. For fully supervised adversarial training the above hyperparameter configuration fails
due to overfitting, as we report in detail in Appendix B.4. Stability training did not exhibit overfitting,
but longer training did not improve results: we trained Baselinest(50K) for 19.5K gradient steps, i.e.
100 epochs at batch size 256. We also tried training for 200 and 400 epochs, but saw no improvement
when comparing certification results over 10% of the data.
B.2 Implementation and running times
We implement our experiments in PyTorch [29], using open source code from [48, 6]. We ran all our
experiments on Titan Xp GPU’s. Training RSTadv(50K+500K) took 28 hours on 4 GPU’s. Running
PGOurs on a Wide ResNet 28-10 took 30 minutes on 4 GPU’s. Training RSTstab(50K+500K) took 40
hours on 2 Titan Xp GPU’s. Running randomized smoothing certification on Wide ResNet 28-10
took 19 hours on 2 GPU’s.
B.3 Tuning attacks
In this section, we provide details on how we tuned the parameters for the projected gradient
attack to evaluate adversarially trained models. Let PG(η, τ, ρ) to denote an attack with step-size η
performing τ steps, with ρ restarts. We tune the attacks to maximally reduce the accuracy of our
model RSTadv(50K+500K).
For every restart, we start with a different random initialization within the `∞ ball of radius
. At every step of every restart, we check if an adversarial example (i.e. an input that causes
misclassification in the model) was found. We report the final accuracy as the percentage of examples
where no successful adversarial example was found across all steps and restarts.
We first focus on  = 8/255 which is the main size of perturbation of interest in this paper. We
report all the numbers with 1 significant figure and observe around 0.05% variation across multiple
runs of the same attack on the same model.
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Number of steps τ η = 0.005 η = 0.01 η = 0.02
τ = 20 63.4 62.9 62.9
τ = 40 62.8 62.5 63
τ = 60 62.6 62.5 62.8
Table 2: Tuning the step-size η for the PG attack. Over the range of step numbers considered,
η = 0.01 was the most effective against our model.
Number of restarts Robust accuracy
ρ = 2 62.7
ρ = 4 62.5
ρ = 6 62.5
ρ = 8 62.4
ρ = 10 62.4
ρ = 12 62.4
ρ = 14 62.3
ρ = 16 62.3
ρ = 18 62.3
ρ = 20 62.3
Table 3: Effect of number of restarts on robust accuracy with fixed step-size η = 0.01 and number of
steps τ = 40.
Step-size. We use ρ = 5 restarts and experiment tune the number of steps and the steps size.
We tried 20, 40, 60 steps and step sizes 0.005, 0.01 and 0.02. Table 2 summarizes the results. We
see that the mid step-size η = 0.01 provided the best accuracy, across the range of steps. We also
chose τ = 40 for computational benefit, since larger τ did not seem to provide much gain. We thus
obtained the PGOurs configuration with η = 0.01, τ = 40, ρ = 5, that we used to test multiple reruns
of our model and other models from the literature.
To compare to previous attacks typically used in the literature: PGMadry [23] corresponds to
η = 0.007, ρ = 1 and τ = 20, and PGTRADES [48] corresponds to η = 0.003, ρ = 1 and τ = 20, without
random initializations (attack is always initialized at the test input x). We use both more steps and
more restarts than used typically, and also tune the step-size to observe that η = 0.01 was worse for
our model than the smaller step-size of 0.007.
Number of restarts. PG attack which performs projected gradient method on a non-convex
objective is typically sensitive to the exact initialization point. Therefore, multiple restarts are
generally effective in bringing down robust accuracy. We now experiment with the effect of number
of restarts. We perform upto 20 restarts and see a very gradual decrease in robust accuracy, with
around 0.2% drop from just using 5 restarts. See Table 3 for the robust accuracies at different
number of restarts. We remark that using a much larger number of steps or restarts could cause
additional degradation (as in [15]), but we stick to the order of steps and restarts that are typically
reported in the literature.
Fine-tuning for different . Figure 14 reports the accuracies for different . A smaller  would
typically require a smaller step-size. We fine-tune the step-size for each  separately, by fixing the
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Figure 3: Comparison of training traces for different hyperpameters of adversarial training. Dashed
lines show standard accuracy on the entire CIFAR-10 test set, and whole lines show robust accuracy
against PGTRADES evaluated on the first 500 images in the CIFAR-10 test set.
number of restarts to 5 and number of steps to 40.
• For  = 0.008, we span η ∈ {0.001, 0.002, 0.005}.
• For  = 0.016, we span η ∈ {0.002, 0.005, 0.01}.
• For  = 0.024, we span η ∈ {0.005, 0.01, 0.02}.
• For  = 0.039, we span η ∈ {0.005, 0.01, 0.02}.
B.4 Comparison with hyperparameters in [48]
As a baseline for adversarial robust self-training, we attempted to reproduce the results of [48],
whose publicly-released model has 56.6% robust accuracy against PGTRADES, 55.3% robust accuracy
against PGOurs, and 84.9% standard accuracy. However, performing adversarial training with the
hyper-parameters described in Appendix B.1 produces a poor result: the resulting model has only
50.8% robust accuracy against PGOurs, and slightly better 85.8% standard accuracy. We then changed
all the hyper-parameters to be the same as in [48], with the exception of the model architecture,
which we kept at Wide ResNet 28-10. The resulting model performed somewhat better, but still not
on par with the numbers reported in [48].
Examining the training traces (Figure 3) reveals that without unlabeled data, both hyper-
parameter configurations suffer from overfitting. More precisely, the robust accuracy degrades
towards the end of the training, while standard accuracy gradually improves. In contrast, we see no
such overfitting with RSTadv(50K+500K), directly showing how unlabeled data aids generalization.
Finally, we perform “early-stopping” with the model trained according to [48], selecting the model
with highest validation robust accuracy. This model has 55.5% robust accuracy against PGTRADES,
54.1% robust accuracy against PGOurs, and 84.5% standard accuracy. This is reasonably close to the
result of [48], considering we used a slightly lower-capacity model.
B.5 Comparison between stability and noise training
As we report in Section 5.1.2, our fully supervised baseline for stability training, i.e. Baselinestab(50K),
significantly outperforms the model trained in [6] and available online. There are three a-priori
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Figure 4: Certified accuracy as a function of `2 perturbation radius, comparing two architectures, two
hyperparameter sets and two training objectives. (a) Both stability training and our hyperparameter
choice improve performance. (b) Increasing model capacity improves performance further, and
stability training remains beneficial.
reasons for that: (i) our Wide ResNet 28-10 has higher capacity than the ResNet-110 used in [6],
(ii) we employ a different training configuration (e.g. a cosine instead of step learning rate schedule)
and (iii) we use stability training while Cohen et al. [6] use a different training objective. Namely,
Cohen et al. [6] add N (0, σ2I) to the input during training, but treat the noise as data augmentation,
minimizing the loss
Ex′∼N (x,σ2I)Lstandard(θ, x′, y).
We refer to the training method of [6] as noise training.
To test which of these three differences causes the gap in performance we train the following
additional models. First, we perform noise training with ResNet-110, but otherwise use the same
configuration used to train Baselinestab(50K). Second, we keep the ResNet-110 architecture and
our training configuration, and use stability training instead. Finally, we perform noise training on
Wide ResNet 28-10 with all other parameters the same as Baselinestab(50K). As our goal in this
section is to compare supervised training techniques for randomized smoothing, these experiments
only use the CIFAR-10 training set (and no unlabeled data).
We plot the performance of all of these models, as well as the model of [6] and Baselinestab(50K),
in Figure 4. Starting with the model of [6] and using our training configuration increases accuracy
by 2–3% across most perturbation radii. Switching to stability training reduces clean accuracy
by roughly 3%, but dramatically increases robustness at large radii, with a 13% improvement at
radius 0.5. Using the larger Wide ResNet 28-10 model further improves performance by roughly
2%. We also see that noise training on Wide ResNet 28-10 performs better at radii below 0.25, and
worse on larger radii. With stability training it is possible to further explore the tradeoff between
accuracy at low and high radii by tuning the parameter β in (6), but we did not pursue this (all of
our experiments are with β = 6).
B.6 Sourcing unlabeled data for CIFAR-10
Here we provide a detailed description of the sourcing process we describe in Section 5.1.1. To
obtain unlabeled data distributed similarly to the CIFAR-10 images, we use the 80 Million Tiny
Images (80M-TI) dataset [39]. This dataset contains 79,302,017 color images that were obtained
via querying various keywords in a number of image search engines, and resizing the results to a
32x32 resolution. CIFAR-10 is a manually-labeled subset of 80M-TI. However, most of the 80M-TI
do not fall into any of the CIFAR-10 categories (see Figure 5a) and the query keywords constitute
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very weak labels (Figure 5b). To select relevant images, we train a classifier to classify TI data as
relevant or not, in the following steps.
Training data for selection model. We create an 11-class training set consisting of the CIFAR-
10 training set and 1M images sampled at random from the 78,712,306 images in 80M-TI with
keywords that did not appear in CIFAR-10. We similarly sample an additional 10K images for
validation.
Training the selection model. We train an 11-way classifier on this dataset, with the same
Wide ResNet 28-10 architecture employed in the rest of our experiments. We use the hyperparmeters
described in Appendix B.1, except we run for 117K gadient steps. We use batch size 256 and
comprise each batch from 128 CIFAR-10 images and 128 80M-TI images, and we also weight the loss
of the “80M-TI” class by 0.1 to balance its higher number of examples. During training we evaluate
the model on its accuracy of discriminating between CIFAR-10 and 80M-TI on a combination of
the CIFAR-10 test and the 10K 80M-TI validation images, and show the training trace in Figure 7.
Towards the end of the training, the CIFAR-10 vs. 80M-TI accuracy started to degrade, and we
therefore chose and earlier checkpoint (marked in the figure) to use as the data selection model. This
model achieves 93.8% CIFAR-10 vs. 80M-TI test accuracy.
Removing CIFAR-10 test set. To ensure that there is no leakage of the CIFAR-10 test set to
the unlabeled data we source, we remove from 80M-TI all near-duplicates of the CIFAR-10 test set.
Following [32], we define a near-duplicate as an image with `2 distance below 2000/255 to any of the
CIFAR-10 test images. We visually confirm that images with distance greater than 2000/255 are
substantially different. Our near-duplicate removal procedure leaves 65,807,640 valid candidates.
Selecting the unlabeled data. We apply our classifier on 80M-TI, with all images close to the
CIFAR-10 test set excluded as described above. For each CIFAR-10 class, we select the 50,000
images which our classifier predicts with the highest confidence as belonging to that class. This is
our unlabeled dataset, depicted in Figure 6, which is 10x the original CIFAR-10 training set and
approximately class balanced.
Examining Figure 6, it is clear that our unlabeled dataset is not entirely relevant to the CIFAR-10
classification task. In particular, many of the “frog” and “deer” images are not actually frogs and deer.
It is likely possible to obtain higher quality data by tuning the selection model (and particularly its
training) more carefully. We chose not to do so for two reasons. First, allowing some amount of
irrelevant unlabeled data more realistically simulates robust self-training in other contexts. Second,
for a totally fair comparison against [48], we chose not to use state-of-the-art architectures or training
techniques for the data selection model, and instead make it as close as possible to the final robust
model.
C Additional CIFAR-10 experiments
C.1 Alternative semisupervised training method
In this section, we consider the straightforward adaptation of virtual adversarial training (VAT) to
the (real) adversarial robustness setting of interest in this paper.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5: Random images from the 80 Million Tiny Images data. (a) Images drawn from the entire
dataset. (b) Images drawn for the subset with keywords that appeared in CIFAR-10; matching
keywords only weakly correlates with membership in one of the CIFAR-10 classes.
Training objective. Recall that we consider robust losses on the following form.
Lrobust(θ, x, y) = Lstandard(θ, x, y) + βLreg(θ, x),
where Lreg(θ, x) := max
x′∈Bp (x)
DKL(pθ(· | x) ‖ pθ(· | x′)).
The Lreg term does not require labels, and hence could be evaluated on the unlabeled data
directly—exactly as done in Virtual Adversarial Training. As is commonly done in standard
semisupervised learning, we also consider an additional entropy regularization term, to discourage the
model from reaching the degenerate solution of mapping unlabeled inputs to uniform distributions.
The total training objective is
n∑
i=1
Lstandard(θ, xi, yi) + β
( n∑
i=1
Lreg(θ, xi) + w
n˜∑
i=1
Lreg(θ, x˜i)
)
+ λent
n˜∑
i=1
h(pθ(· | x˜i)), (18)
where h(pθ(· | x˜i)) = −
∑
y∈sY
pθ(y | x˜i) log pθ(y | x˜i) is the entropy of the probability distribution over
the class labels. We denote models trained according to this objective by rVAT.
There are two differences between VAT and (18). First, to minimize the loss, VAT takes gradients
of DKL(pθ(· | x) ‖ pθ(· | x′)) w.r.t. θ only through pθ(· | x′), treating pθ(· | x) as a constant. Second,
VAT computes perturbations x′ ∈ B2 (x) that are somewhere between random and adversarial, using
a small number of (approximate) power iterations on ∇2x′DKL(pθ(· | x) ‖ pθ(· | x′)).
We experiment with both the adversarial training based regularization (7) and stability training
based regularizer (8).
Training details. We consider the alternative semisupervised objetive (18) and compare with
robust self-training. We use the same hyperparmeters as the rest of the main experiments, described
in Appendix B.1, and tune the additional hyperparameter λent. Setting λent = β = 6 would
correspond to the entropy weight suggested in VAT [24], since they use a logarithmic loss and not
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Figure 6: A random sample of our approximately class-balanced 500K auxiliary images, rows
correspond to class predictions made by our data selection model. Note the multiple errors on “frog”
and “deer”.
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Figure 7: Test accuracy through training for the unlabeled data selection model.
KL-divergence. We experiment with λent between 0 and 6. Due to computational constraints, we
use the smaller model Wide ResNet 40-2 for tuning this hyperparameter in the adversarially trained
models. We also perform certification via randomized smoothing on 1000 random examples from the
test set, rather than the entire test set.
Results. Figures 8 and 9 summarize the results for stability training. We see that the alternative
approach also yields gains (albeit much smaller than robust self-training) over the baseline supervised
setting, due to the additional unlabeled data.
Table 4 presents the accuracies against PGOurs for the smaller Wide ResNet 40-2 models with
different settings of λent. We see a steady degradation in the performance with increasing λent. For
λent = 0, we also train a large Wide ResNet 28-10 to compare to our state-of-the-art self-trained
RSTadv(50K+500K) that has the same architecture.
We see that in both adversarial training (heuristic defense) and stability training (certified
defense), robust self-training significantly outperforms the alternative approach suggesting that
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Model architecture Training algorithm PGOurs No attack
Wide ResNet 40-2 Baselineadv(50K) 52.1 81.3
Wide ResNet 40-2 rVATadv(50K+500K), λent = 0 53.6 81.5
Wide ResNet 40-2 rVATadv(50K+500K), λent = 0.1 52.9 77.9
Wide ResNet 40-2 rVATadv(50K+500K), λent = 0.6 43.4 60.0
Wide ResNet 40-2 rVATadv(50K+500K), λent = 3.0 15.4 19.1
Wide ResNet 28-10 TRADES [48] 55.4 84.9
Wide ResNet 28-10 rVATadv(50K+500K), λent = 0 56.5 83.2
Wide ResNet 28-10 RSTadv(50K+500K) 62.5 89.7
Table 4: Accuracy of adversarially trained models against our PG attack. We see that VAT-like
consistency-based regularization produces only minor gains over a baseline without unlabeled data,
significantly underperforming robust self-training.
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Figure 8: Certified `2 accuracy as a function of the radius, for Wide ResNet 28-10 trained using
different semisupervised approaches on the augmented CIFAR10 dataset.
“locking in” the pseudo-labels is important. This is possibly due to the fact that we are in a
regime where the pseudo-labels are quite accurate and hence provide good direct signal to the
model. Another possible explanation for the comparative weak performance of rVAT is that since
the robustly-trained never reaches good clean accuracy, it cannot effectively bootstrap the model’s
own prediction as training progresses.
Additional experiments. VAT combined with entropy minimization is one of the most succesful
semisupervised learning algorithm for standard accuracy [27]. As we mentioned earlier, the objective
in (18) differs from VAT by not treating pθ(· | x˜) as a constant. From the open source implementation3,
we also note that batch normalization parameters are not updated on the “adversarial” perturbations
during training. We tried both variants on the smaller model Wide ResNet 40-2 and observed
that neither modification affected final performance in our setting. Further, we also experimented
with different values of the unlabeled data weighting parameter w. We observed no noticeable
improvement in final performance by changing this parameter.
C.2 Comparison with data augmentation
Advanced data augmentation techniques such as cutout [10] and AutoAugment policies [7] provide
additional inductive bias about the task at hand. Can data augmentation provide gains in CIFAR-
3https://github.com/lyakaap/VAT-pytorch
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Figure 9: Effect of entropy weight on performance of stability training with alternate semisupervised
approach. Larger entropy weight leads to gains in robustness at larger radii at a cost in robustness
at smaller radii. However, robust self-training outperforms the alternative semisupervised approach
over all radii, for all settings of the entropy weight hyperparameter.
Model PGOurs No attack
TRADES [48] 55.4 84.9
Baselineadv(50K) 47.5 84.8
+ Cutout [10] 51.2 85.8
+ AutoAugment [7] 47.4 84.5
RSTadv(50K+500K) 62.5 89.7
Table 5: Accuracy of adversarially trained models against PGOurs. We see that cutout provides
marginal gains and AutoAugment leads to slightly worse performance than our baseline that only
uses the standard crops and flips.
10 robust training, similar to those we observe by augmenting the CIFAR-10 dataset with extra
unlabeled images?
Implementation details. We use open source implementations for cutout4 and AutoAugment5,
and use the same training hyperparameters from the papers introducing these techniques. We first
train Wide ResNet 28-10 via standard training and reproduce the test accuracies reported in the
papers [10, 7].
Training details. We perform robust supervised training, where the each batch contains augmented
(cutout/autoaugment in additional to random crops and flips) of the CIFAR10 training set.
We use the same training setup with which we performed robust self-training, as described
in Appendix B.1, except we applied augmentation instead of adding unlabeled data, and that we
perform stability training for only 39K steps. Note that this model and optimization configuration
are identical to those used in the AutoAugment paper [7], except increasing batch size to 256.
Results. Table 5 presents the results on accuracy of the heuristic adversarially trained models
against our PG variant PGOurs for  = 8/255. We also tabulate the performance of Baselineadv(50K),
which doesn’t use any unlabeled data or augmentation—as we show in Appendix B.4, this configura-
tion produces poor results due to overfitting. We see that AutoAugment offers no improvement over
4https://github.com/uoguelph-mlrg/Cutout
5https://github.com/DeepVoltaire/AutoAugment
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Figure 10: Comparing certified `2 accuracy as a function of certified radius, computed via randomized
smoothing for different data augmentation methods.
75
80
85
90
95
Baselineadv(50K)
Baselineadv(50K) + Cutout
Baselineadv(50K) + AutoAug
RSTadv(50K+500K): Our hyperparams
0 20 40 60 80 100
% training
40
45
50
55
60
Figure 11: Training traces adversarial training with robust self-training and various forms of data
augmentation. Dashed lines show standard accuracy on the entire CIFAR-10 test set, and whole
lines show robust accuracy against PGTRADES evaluated on the first 500 images in the CIFAR-10 test
set. AutoAugment shows the same overfitting as standard augmentation, while cutout mitigates
overfitting, but does not provide the gains of self-training.
Baselineadv(50K), while cutout ofer a 4% improvement that is still far from the performance [48]
attains with just early stopping. In Figure 11 we plot training training traces, and show that
AutoAugment fails to prevent overffiting, while cutout provides some improvement, but is till far
away from the effect of robust self-training.
We also perform certification using randomized smoothing on the stability trained models. We use
the same certification parameters as our main experiments (N0 = 100, N = 104, α = 10−3, σ = 0.25)
and compute the certificate over every 10th image in the CIFAR-10 test set (1000 images in all)
for all the models. As we only train for 31K steps, we compare the results to an RSTstab(50K+500K)
model trained for the same amount of steps (and evaluated on the same subset of images). We plot
the results to obtain Figure 10. As can be seen, data augmentation provides performance essentially
identical to that of a baseline without augmentation. Overall, it is interesting to note that the
gains provided by data augmentation for standard training do not manifest in robust training (both
adversarial and stability training).
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C.3 Effect of unlabeled data relevance
Semisupervised learning algorithms are often sensitive to the relevance of the unlabeled data. That
is, if too much of the unlabeled data does not correspond to any label, the learning algorithm might
fail to benefit from the unlabeled dataset, and may even produce worse results simply using labeled
data only. This sensitivity was recently demonstrated in a number of semisupervised neural network
training techniques [27]. In the simple Gaussian model of Section 3, our analysis in Appendix A.5
shows that any fixed fraction of relevant unlabeled data will allow self-training to attain robustness,
but that the overall sample complexity grows inversely with the square of the relevant fraction.
To test the practical effect of data relevance on robust self-training, we conduct the following
experiment. We draw 500K random images from the 80M-TI with CIFAR-10 test set near-duplicates
removed (see Appendix B.6), which rarely portray one of the CIFAR-10 classes (see Figure 5a); this
is our proxy for irrelevant data. We mix the irrelevant dataset and our main unlabeled image dataset
with different proportions, creating a sequence of unlabeled datasets with a growing degree of image
relevance, each with 500K images.
We then perform adversarial- and stability- robust self-training on each of those datasets as
described in Section 5 and Appendix B.1, except here we use a smaller Wide ResNet 40-2 model to
conserve computation resources. We evaluate each of those models as in Section 5.1.2, and compare
them to a fully supervised baseline. For stability training we train the baseline as in Section 5.1.2,
except with Wide ResNet 40-2. For adversarial training, in view of our findings in Appendix B.4,
we train our baseline with Wide ResNet 40-2 and the training hyperparameters of [48] (β is still 6).
Here, we did not observe overfitting in the training trace, and therefore used the model from the
final epoch of training. This baseline achieves 81.3% standard accuracy and 52.1% robust accuracy
against PGOurs.
In Figure 12 we plot the difference in PGOurs/certified accuracy as a function of the relevant
data fraction. We see the performance grows essentially monotonically with data relevance, as
expected. We also observe that smoothing seems to be more sensitive to data relevance, and we see
performance degradation for completely irrelevant and 20% relevant data. For adversarial training
we see no performance degradation, but the gain with completely irrelevant data is negligible as
can be expected. Finally, at around 80% relevant data performance seems close to that of 100%
relevant data. This is perhaps not too surprising, considering that even our “100% relevant” data is
likely somewhere between 90-95% relevant (see Appendix B.6). This is also roughly in line with our
theoretical model, where there is a small degradation in performance for relevant fraction α = 0.8.
C.4 Effect of unlabeled data amount
We have conducted all of our previous experiment on an unlabeled dataset of fixed size (500K images).
Here we test the effect of the size of the unlabeled dataset on robust self-training performance. The
main question we would like to answer here is how much further performance gain can we expect
from further increasing the data set: should we expect another 7% improvement over [48] by adding
500K more images (of similar relevance), or perhaps we would need to add 5M images, or is it the
case that the benefit plateaus after a certain amount of unlabeled data?
There is a number of complicating factors in answering this question. First, 80M-TI does not
provide us much more than 500K relevant unlabeled images, certainly not if we wish it to be
approximately class-balanced; the more images we take from 80M-TI the lower their relevance.
Second, as the amount of data changes, some training hyperparameters might have to change as
well. In particular, with more unlabeled data, we expect to require more gradient steps before
achieving convergence. Even for 500K images we haven’t completely exhausted the possible gains
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Figure 12: Performance improvement as a function of unlabeled data relevance, for Wide ResNet 40-2
models, relative to training without unlabeled data. When present, error bars indicate the range of
variation (minimum to maximum) over 5 independent runs. (a) Difference in standard accuracy and
in accuracy under the `∞ attack PGOurs, for adversarially-trained models. (b) Difference in standard
accuracy and in certified `2 accuracy for smoothed stability-trained models.
from longer training. Finally, it might be the case that higher capacity models are crucial for
extracting benefit from larger amounts of unlabeled data. For these reasons, and considering our
computational constraints, we decided that attempting to rerun our experiment with more unlabeled
data will likely yield inconclusive results, and did not attempt it.
Instead, we sub-sampled our 500K images set randomly into nested subsets of varying size, and
repeated our experiment of Section 5.1.2 with these smaller datasets. With this experiment we hope
to get some understanding of the trend with which performance improves. Since we expect model
capacity to be very important for leveraging more data, we perform this experiment using the same
high-capacity Wide ResNet 28-10 used in our main experiment. For adversarial training, we use
exactly the same training configuration for all unlabeled dataset sizes. For stability training, we
also use the same configuration except we attempted to tune the number of gradient steps. For
each dataset size, we started by running 19.5K gradient steps, and doubled the number of gradient
steps until we no longer saw improvement in performance. For 40K extra data, we saw the best
results with 39K gradient steps, and for 100K and 240K extra data we saw the best result with
78K gradient steps. Similarly to the data relevance experiment in Appendix C.3, we compare each
training result with a baseline. Here the baselines are the same as those reported in Section 5.1.2:
for adversarial training we compare to the publicly available model of [48], and for stability training
we use Baselinestab(50K).
We plot the results in Figure 13. As the figure shows, accuracy always grows with the data size,
except for one errant data point at 40K unlabeled data with adversarial training, which performs
worse than the baseline. While we haven’t seen overfitting in this setting as we have when attempting
to reproduce [48], we suspect that the reason for the apparent drop in performance is that our
training configuration was not well suited to so few unlabeled data. We also see in the plot that the
higher the robustness, the larger the benefit from additional data.
The experiment shows that 100K unlabeled data come about halfway to achieving the gain of
500K unlabeled data. Moreover, for the most part the plots appear to be concave, suggesting that
increase in data amount provides diminishing returns—even on a logarithmic scale. Extrapolating
this trend to higher amounts of data would suggest we are likely to require very large amount of
data to see another 7% improvement. However, the negative value at 40K unlabeled data hints at
the danger of trying to extrapolate this figure—since we haven’t carefully tuned the training at each
data amount (including the one at 500K!), we cannot describe any trend with confidence. At most,
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Figure 13: Performance improvement as a function of unlabeled data amount, relative to training
without unlabeled data. . When present, error bars indicate the range of variation (minimum to
maximum) over 3 independent runs. (a) Difference in standard accuracy and in accuracy under
the `∞ attack PGOurs, for adversarially-trained models. (b) Difference in standard accuracy and in
certified `2 accuracy for smoothed stability-trained models, at different radii.
we can say that under our computation budget, model architecture and training configuration, it
seems likely the benefit of unlabeled data plateaus at around 500K examples. It also seems likely
that as computation capabilities increase and robust training improves, the point of diminishing
returns will move towards higher data amounts.
C.5 Standard self-training.
We also test whether our unlabeled data can improve standard accuracy. We perform stan-
dard self-training to obtain the model SST(50K+500K); all training parameters are identical to
RSTstab(50K+500K), except we do not add noise. SST(50K+500K) attains test accuracy 96.4%, a 0.4%
improvement over standard supervised learning with identical training parameters on 50K labeled
dataset. This difference is above the training variability of around 0.1% [46, 7], but approaches like
aggressive data augmentation [7] provide much larger gains for the same model (to 97.4%).
C.6 Performance against different PG attack radii
In Figure 14, we evaluate robustness of our state-of-the-art RSTadv(50K+500K) on a range of different
values of  and compare to TRADES [48], where we fine-tune attacks for each value of  separately
for each model (see Appendix B.3). We see a consistent gain in robustness across the different values
of .
D SVHN experiment details
Here we give a detailed description on our SVHN experiments reported in Section 5.2.
D.1 Experimental setup
Most of our experimental setup for SVHN is the same as in CIFAR-10, except for the following
differences.
• Architecture. Throughout the SVHN experiments we use a slightly smaller Wide ResNet 16-8
model.
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Figure 14: Comparing `∞ accuracy to tuned PG for various . RSTadv(50K+500K) has higher accuracy
than a state-of-the-art supervised model, across the range of .
• Robust self-training. Since here the unlabeled data is 100% relevant, we set w = 1 by sampling
every batch from a single pool containing the labeled and unlabeled data. We still use β = 6
throughout; we performed brief tuning over β to make sure that 6 is a reasonable value for SVHN.
• Adversarial training. We perform adversarial training with the same parameters as before and
as in [48], with one exception: we set the perturbation magnitude  = 4/255 (we use step size
0.007 and 10 steps as in CIFAR-10). As we discuss below, adversarial training with the current
configuration and  = 8/255 produced weak and inconsistent results.
• Stability training. No change.
• Input normalization. No change.
• Data augmentation. Following [46] we do not perform any data augmentation.
• Optimizer configuration. We use the same parameters as before, except here we keep the
batch size at 128.
• Number of gradient steps. We run 98K gradient steps in every SVHN experiment. For stability
training we attempted to double the number of gradient steps and did not observe improved
results.
D.2 Pseudo-label generation and standard self-training.
To generate pseudo-labels we perform standard training of an Wide ResNet 16-8 model as described
above on the core SVHN training set only. This model attains 96.6% test accuracy, and we use it to
generate all the pseudo-labels in our SVHN experiments.
For comparison we repeat this procedure on the entire SVHN data (with all the labels). The
resulting model has 98.2% test accuracy. Finally, we apply standard self-training using the configu-
ration described above, i.e. we replace the SVHN extra labels with the pseudo-labels—this corrupts
1.6% of the extra labels (the extra data is easier to classify than the test set). Self-training produces
a model with 97.1% accuracy, similar to the 0.4% improvement we observed on CIFAR-10, and 1.1%
short of using true labels.
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`2 radius: 0 0.22 0.435 0.555
Enclosed `∞ radius: 0 1/255 2/255 0.01
Model
Baselinestab(604K) 93.6 84.9 70.0 59.8
RSTstab(73K+531K) 93.2 84.5 69.7 59.5
Baselinestab(73K) 90.1 80.2 65.0 55.0
Table 6: SVHN certified test accuracy (%) for different `2 perturbations radii, and the `∞ certified
robustness they imply.
D.3 Evaluation and attack details
We perform randomizes smoothing certification exactly as in the CIFAR-10 experiments in Sec-
tion 5.1.2. For evaluating heuristic defenses, we fine-tune the PG attack to maximally break
RSTadv(73K+531K) to obtain PGOurs with the following parameters: step-size η = 0.005, number of
steps τ = 100 and number of restarts ρ = 10. We evaluate models at  = 4/255, which is the same
as the value we used during training.
Compared to CIFAR-10, we find that we require larger number of steps for SVHN attacks.
Interestingly, for  = 8/255 (which is what we evaluate our CIFAR-10 models on), we find that even
after 1000 steps, we see a steady decrease in accuracy (when evaluated over a small random subset
of the test set). However, for a smaller value of ε = 4/255 (which is what we finally report on), we
see that the accuracies seem to saturate after 100 steps of the attack.
D.4 Comparison with results in the literature
In the context of adversarial robustness, SVHN was not studied extensively in the literature, and in
most cases there are no clear benchmarks to compare to. Unlike CIFAR-10, there is no agreed-upon
benchmark perturbation radius for heuristic `∞ defenses. Moreover, we are not aware of a heuristic
SVHN defense that withstood significant scrutiny. A previous heuristic defense [16] against attacks
with  = 12/255 was subsequently broken [11]. In [35], the authors study SVHN attacks with
 = 4/255 but do not tabulate their results. Visual inspection of their figures indicates that we get
better robust accuracies than [35] by over 7%, likely due to using a higher capacity model, better
training objectives and better hyperparameters.
Two recent works constitute the state-of-the-art for certified robustness in SVHN. Cohen et al.
[6] study randomized smoothing certification of `2 robustness and report some results for SVHN,
but do not tabulate them and did not release a model. Their figure shows a sharp cutoff at radius
0.3, suggesting a different input normalization than the one we used. In view of our comparison
in Appendix B.5, it seems likely that our model attains higher certified accuracy. Gowal et al. [14]
propose interval bound propagation for certified `∞ robustness. They report a model with 85.2%
standard accuracy, and 62.4% certified robust accuracy against `∞ attacks with  = 0.01.
In Table 6 we list selected point from Figure 2, showing certified accuracy as a function of `2
perturbation radius. For each `2 radius we also list the radius of the largest `∞ ball contained within
in it, allowing comparison between our results and [14]. At the `2 radius that contains an `∞ ball of
radius 0.01 we certify accuracy of 59.8%, less than 3% below than the result of Gowal et al. [14].
This number is likely easy to improve by tuning σ and β used in stability training, situating it as a
viable alternative to interval bound propagation in SVHN as well as CIFAR-10.
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E Comparison to Uesato et al. [41]
Independently from our work, Uesato et al. [41] also study semisupervised adversarial learning
theoretically in the Gaussian model of [35] and empirically via experiments on CIFAR-10, Tiny
Images, and SVHN. Overall, Uesato et al. [41] reach conclusions similar to ours. Here, we summarize
the main differences between our works.
We can understand the algorithms that [41] propose as instances of Meta-Algorithm 1 with
different choices of Lrobust. In particular, their most successful algorithm (UAT++) corresponds to
LUAT++robust (θ, x, y) = max
x′∈Bp (x)
Lstandard(θ, x
′, y) + λLreg(θ, x),
where Lreg(θ, x) = maxx′∈Bp (x)DKL(pθ(· | x) ‖ pθ(· | x′)) as in (6). In contrast, we do not maximize
over Lstandard, i.e. we use
Lrobust(θ, x, y) = Lstandard(θ, x, y) + λLreg(θ, x).
Both this work and [41] perform adversarial training on CIFAR-10 with additional unlabeled data
from Tiny Images. Both works consider the benchmark of `∞ perturbations with radius  = 8/255
and report results against a range of attacks, which in both papers includes PGTRADES [48]. For this
attack, our best-performing models have robust accuracies within 1% of each other (their WRN-106-8
is 1.1% higher than our WRN-28-10, and their WRN-34-8 is 1% lower), and we obtain about 3%
higher standard accuracy.
Beyond the algorithmic and model size difference, Uesato et al. [41] use different training
hyperparameters, most notably larger batch sizes. Additionally, to source unlabeled data from 80
Million Tiny images they use a combination of keyword filtering and predictions from a standard
CIFAR-10 model. In contrast, we do not use keywords at all and train a classifier to distinguish
CIFAR-10 from Tiny Images. Both works remove the CIFAR-10 dataset prior to selecting images
from TI; we also remove an `2 ball around the CIFAR-10 test set. Due to these multiple differences
and similar final accuracies, we cannot determine which robust loss provides better performance.
Uesato et al. [41] perform a number of experiments that complement ours. First, they show strong
improvements in the low labeled data regimes by removing most labels from CIFAR-10 and SVHN
(similar findings appear also in [47, 26]). Second, they demonstrate that their method is tolerant to
inaccurate pseudo-labels via a controlled study. Finally, they propose a new “MultiTargeted” attack
that reduces the reported accuracies of the state-of-the-art robust models by 3-8%. Contributions
unique to our work include showing that unlabeled data improves certified robustness via randomized
smoothing and studying the effect of irrelevant data theoretically and experimentally.
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